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L Introduction
Roughly a year ago, in Chalk v. U.S. District Court Central California,'
a United States appellate court authorized a teacher to return to his
teaching duties, after a California school department had barred him
from his classroom upon learning he had Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS). The case parallels the widely reported events of the
Eric Smith story of Autumn 1987. Teacher Smith was initially removed
from his Shelburne County, Nova Scotia classroom, and reassigned to
non-teaching duties after a medical secretary disclosed that Smith had
tested positive for the AIDS virus.2 While Smith immediately refused the
*Of the Maine and Massachusetts Bars; Consultative Lawyer, Law Reform Commission of
Canada
**Assistant Professor of Law, McGill University
***The authors wish to thank Helen Hamilton, Peter LaFond, Donna Greschner, Eric Smith,
Wayne MacKay, Maura Ricketts and Bill Foster for their help in preparing this article. The
views expressed herein are the authors' and do not necessarily reflect those of the insititutions
with which they are affiliated.
1. 840 F. 2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988).
2. See" Globe & Mail March 27-28, 1988 at A4. Eric Smith's story has been recounted in
several publications. See Erin Goodman, "The Trials of Eric Smith" New Maritimes, Sept./
Oct. 1988, 15-24; Globe & Mail Oct. 3, 1987, D2; Oct. 8, 1987 at A3; Oct. 17, 1987 at A4;
Oct. 21, 1987 at A3; Parker Bauss Donham, "Eric Smith", Chatelaine April 1988, 87; Halifax
Mail Star, Aug. 29, 1987, at 1; Oct. 16, 1987 at 14; Oct. 21, 1987 at 1; Mar. 15, 1988 at 15;
Halifax Chronicle Heral4 Mar. 15, 1988 at 1, 2. On the basis of these publications and
personal communications with Eric Smith, we have developed the following chronology:
Sept. 1986: Smith receives treatment for sexually transmitted disease in Shelburne. After a
comment by Smith that he is gay, the doctor submits the collected blood samples to an AIDS
test without Smith's knowledge or consent.
Sept 1987: Shelburne County District School Board issues press release, stating that a teacher
at Cape Sable Island school has the AIDS virus and will be transferred to an administrative
position.
Sept 1987: Smith seeks assistance from his Union, the Nova Scotia Teachers' Union (NSTU).
NSTU issues a press release that it will not contest the reassignment, despite a policy that
teachers infected with AIDS should have the right to continue employment. NSTU proposes
a monetary settlement to the School Board between $160,000 to $200,000, which the School
Board declines.
Oct. 6, 1987: School Board reverses its decision, and decides to reinstate Smith to the
classroom effective October 19, 1987.
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reassignment, he eventually accepted an educative position on the Nova
Scotia Task Force on AIDS, which has recently completed its report.3
More recent events suggest that Smith's employment tribulations are
not unique. A labour arbitration board in British Columbia has found the
suspension of an AIDS-afflicted employee to be without cause.4
Moreover, over half of the AIDS cases to be filed with human rights
commissions across Canada have involved employment discrimination
issues.5 The statistics, the issue of legal discrimination against HIV-
infected teachers or other workers, and the factual parallels between
Chalk and the Eric Smith story, combine to suggest that Chalk may be
of interest to those formulating Canadian AIDS discrimination law and
policy. Accordingly, after summarizing the major medical facts and
discussing the details of Chalk, we explore its relevance to Canada. We
conclude with some observations on the emerging North American
consensus on AIDS employment discrimination.
Oct. 9, 1987: Public meeting of "Concerned Parents of Cape Sable Island" opposes Smith's
return to the classroom. They threaten a boycott of Smith's classroom.
Oct. 16, 1987: Education Minister, Tom Mclnnes, announces the creation of a Nova Scotia
Task Force on AIDS with Eric Smith as an appointed member. Smith's acceptance of the
appointment helps diffuse the immediate controversy on Cape Sable Island.
March 14, 1988: Councillors of the Municipality of Shelburne vote in favour of banning
homosexuals, and AIDS-infected teachers, students and other workers from classrooms.
May 2, 1988: Smith accepts a 3-year position as AIDS consultant with Nova Scotia
Department of Education, to commence after the completion of his work on the Nova Scotia
Task Force on AIDS.
Sept. 1988: Report of the Nova Scotia Task Force on AIDS released.
Oct. 198& The Nova Scotia Government rejects Task Force recommendations that the Nova
Scotia Human Rights Act be amended (a) to include express protection for those who have,
who are perceived to have, or who associate with those who have a communicable disease,
provided they pose no significant health risk to others, and (b) to include sexual orientation as
an express ground of discrimination. The N.S. Human Rights Commission has apparently
proposed legislation that substantially adopts these recommendations.
3. Nova Scotia Task Force on AIDS, The Challenge of AIDS: A Nova Scotian Response
(Sept. 1988) (hereinafter cited as NSTFA).
4. Pacific Western Airlines v. Canadian Airline Flight Attendants Assoc. (1987), 28 L.A.C.
(3d) 291. Accord: Walton v. Treasury Board (1987), 16 C.C.E.L. 190, discussed in text
accompanying note 82, infta.
5. Information received from human rights commissions across Canada between November
1988 and February 1989 indicated that 22 of 40 AIDS-related complaints involve
employment matters. By contrast, of some 1650 AIDS discrimination complaints filed with the
New York City Commission on Human Rights, 1983-88, some 30% were employment-related.
Personal communication with AIDS Discrimination Unit of the N.Y.C.C.H.R., March 1989.
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I. Medical Summary
AIDS was first discovered in North America in 1981. In 1983, the virus
that causes AIDS was identified; it had accounted for 2492 reported
cases in Canada as of March 1989.6 A court has summarized the cause
and spectrum of the disease in a recent school case:
Acquired Immune Deficiency (AIDS) is a disease that disables the body
from fighting infection. The cause of the disease is infection by the Human
T-Lymphotropic Virus, Type III (HLTV-III), also known as Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). Three categories of outcomes result from
infection by HTLV-HI. The first, AIDS, is the most severe form of the
infection; and most victims of the disease die within two years. The second
possible form of infection is AIDS-Related Complex (ARC), a milder
degree of immunodeficiency. The third and most common form of
infection is asymptomatic, resulting in no abnormal infections.7
The detection, treatment, and transmission of HIV-infection are relevant
to understanding the employment and school controversies surrounding
the disease.
1. Testing
In 1985, the enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) blood-
screening test was licensed to detect the presence of antibodies to HIV-
infection (seroconversion, seropositivity).8 Antibodies usually develop
within 12 weeks of infection, but may take up to six months. A falsely
negative test result may register when a recently infected person has not
had time to develop detectable antibodies; on the other hand, a falsely
positive result may register because of the high sensitivity of the ELISA
test.9 In consequence, a standardized testing procedure has developed
whereby if an initial ELISA test is positive, a second ELISA test is
performed followed by a "Western blot" or like confirmatory tests.10
6. Health and Welfare Canada, Federal Centre for AIDS, Surveillance Update" AIDS in
Canada (6 Mar. 1989). Over 85% of the cases were reported from Ontario, Quebec and British
Columbia.
7. Board of Ed, Plainfield v. Cooperman, 523 A.2d 655 at 656 (N.J. 1987) (upholding N.J.
State Commission of Education AIDS policy & guidelines). Two years is apparently a
considerable period of time in the rapidly moving field of AIDS epidemiological research.
Medical authorities' technical redefinition of AIDS and its categories of illness may make some
of the language and categories used in the court excerpt already dated. See CDC, infra, note
10.
8. Kirkendale v. Harbour Ins. Co., 698 F.Supp. 768, 772 (W.D. Ark. 1988) See also, "Blood
Test to Screen for AIDS Virus licensed" (1985), 132 C.M.A.J. 950.
9. Banks & McFadden, "Rush to Judgement: HIV Test Reliability & Screening" (1987), 23
Tulsa L.J. 1.
10. U.S. Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control, "Revision of CDC Surveillance
Case Definition for Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome," (14 Aug. 1987) 36(Supp.)
Morbidity MortaliO, WklyRpt at 10S.
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Once it is confirmed that one is HI-V-infected, the current medical
consensus is that one may transmit the virus, even if that one remains
asymptomatic. Yet it is still not known what percentage of HIV-infected
individuals will have their immune systems compromised to the point of
developing the pneumocystic pneumonia, skin cancer, and like clinical
symptoms and opportunistic infections of "full-blown AIDS.""
2. Treatment
Medical science currently offers no medication for AIDS that parallels
the curative impact that penicillin has had on common sexually
transmitted diseases (STDs). Nor has a vaccine been developed that
would immunize against HIV-infection. 12 Thus, from an historical
perspective society finds itself in a position akin to the position it assumed
prior to the development of a safe and effective treatment for STDs13 and
prior to the 1982 licensure of a vaccine for the similarly transmitted and
potentially lethal Hepatitis B virus (HBV).14 Several drugs are currently in
different phases of development for treating various AIDS-related
illnesses.15 For example, AZT16 is apparently effective in fighting viral
reproduction, in arresting the development of AIDS-related diseases, and
so in prolonging life.17 Another drug called Aerosal Pentamidine has been
more recently enlisted to fight the life threatening pneumonia that may
afflict AIDS patients.18
11. By recent World Health Organization estimates, 50% of those infected with HIV are likely
to develop AIDS within 10 years of infection (Communication with Federal Centre for
AIDS).
12. Mariner, "Why Clinical Trials of AIDS Vaccines are Premature" (1989), 79 Am. J. Pub.
Hith. 86.
13. A. Brandt, No Magic Bullet A Social History of Venereal Disease in the United States
Since 1880 12, 40, 123-4 (1985).
14. See U.S. Public Health Service Centers for Disease Control, "Update on Hepatitis
Prevention" (19 June 1987), 36(23) Morbidity Mortality Weekly Rpt. 353. See also Baker &
Brennan, "Keeping Health Care Workers Healthy: Legal Aspects of Hepatitis B Immunization
Program" (1984), 311(10) N.E.J.M. 684.
15. Under regulations adopted pursuant to the Food and Drug Ac R.S.C., 1985, c.F-27,
drugs become available in Canada (a) as an approved drug, as certified by a "notice of
compliance" attesting to its safety and efficacy (b) as an experimental drug, in strictly
controlled human clinical trials undertaken to test the safety and efficacy of new drugs, or (c)
as an experimental drug, through "emergency drug releases" requested by physicians on
compassionate grounds when standard therapy is not effective and a medical emergency exists.
Health & Welfare Canada, Departmental Consolidation of the Food & Drug Act and of the
Food & Drug Regulations (Amendments to March 1988) ss. c.08.002(i)(b); c.08.005;
c.08.010.
16. "AZT", known technically as azidthymidine or zibovudine, is currently available through
clinical trials in Canada.
17. N.Y 2Tmes, 7 Feb. 1989, at B6.
18. Id
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3. Transmission
The Human Immunodeficiency Virus has been isolated in blood, semen,
tears, saliva, vaginal secretions, urine and other body fluids.19 This fact
gives rise to a theoretical possibility that HIV may be transmitted by
contact with such fluids. There has also been concern that HIV may be
transmitted by sharing bathrooms and telephones, shaking hands, or
otherwise having casual contact with HIV-infected individuals.
The evidence accumulated and studied by medical authorities reveals
a different story, however. The medical evidence overwhelmingly
indicates that HIV infection is transmitted (1) by intimate sexual contact,
(2) by sharing needles contaminated with HIV-infected blood, (3) by an
infected mother to her fetus or newborn child, (4) by transfusion of HIV-
infected blood or blood products.20 The blood, semen and vaginal
secretions implicated in these activities are the primary modes of
transmission. 21 Indeed, Canadian medical recommendations on universal
AIDS precautions for health care workers recently advised that the
precautions do not apply to tears, nasal secretions, vomit, sweat, urine,
etc., unless they contain visible blood.22 Blood-letting, exchanging
intimate sexual fluids, sharing intravenous needles are not the kinds of
activities that characterize the typical job setting. Accordingly, the leading
Canadian and U.S. public health authorities have unanimously
concluded that the "contact that generally occurs among workers and
clients or consumers in the workplace does not pose a risk of transmission
for HTLV-LII/LAV."23 The conclusion also extends to the school.24
While such conclusions and medical evidence may reassure some, they
provide slight assurance for others. Even if the risk of HIV infection is
remote, theoretical, minimal, or dramatically less than the risk of catching
19. Friedland & Klein, "Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus" (1987), 317(18)
N.EJ.M. 1125 at 1132.
20. U.S. Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control, "Summary: Recommendations
for Preventing Transmission of Infection with HTLV-I/LAV in the Workplace" (Part 1) (6
Dec. 1985), 254(21) J.A.M.A. 3023.
21. Friedland, supra, note 19 at 1132.
22. Health & Welfare Canada, "Universal Precautions: Report of a Consensus Meeting" (4
Feb. 1989), 15-5 Canada Diseases Weekly Report 23.
23. CDC, supra, note 20 at 3023.
24. U.S. Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control, "Recommendations for
Preventing Transmission of Infection, Infection with HTLV-III/LAV in the Workplace" (Part
II) (13 Dec. 1985), 254(22) J.A.M.A. 3162 at 3167. See also note 138, infra. The CDC
recommendations on HIV infection in the workplace have been endorsed by the leading
Canadian governmental analyst of public health disease, the Laboratory Centre for Disease
Control/Federal Centre for AIDs, Health & Welfare Canada. See: Pacific & Western, supra,
note 4 at 306. Many of the CDC recommendations have been collected in CDC,
Recommendations & Guidelines Concerning AIDS Published in the Morbidio & Mortality
Weekly Report November 1982-1986 (1986).
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such typical school diseases as the mumps, small pox or measles, it is
argued that subjecting one's child or self to a fatal, incurable disease is a
risk no sane parent should be asked to assume. Add to that the
stigmatization of groups identified as being at higher risk of HIV infection
- homosexuals and others regarded as engaging in unsafe sex,
intravenous drug users, hemophiliacs and others who received multiple
unit blood transfusions before 198525 - and it is predictable that infected
and uninfected individuals perceived as belonging to these groups would
become prime targets of discrimination. As Chalk and the Eric Smith
story will show, it is this tension between reasonable and unreasonable
fear of contagion, objective and subjective risk assessment, and individual
and societal rights, which so drives the AIDS confficts in the workplace
and school house.
II. Chalk v. US. District Court
1. Factual Background
In the California case, an HIV-infected teacher of hearing-impaired
students sought to enjoin a county education department from barring
him from teaching. A teacher of some six years, Vincent Chalk was
hospitalized in February 1987 for pneumonia and was diagnosed as
having AIDS. Chalk underwent treatments and convalescence for two
months before his personal physician discharged him from the hospital
and pronounced him fit for duty. Chalk remained on administrative leave
for another two months, through the end of the school year, during which
time a county physician informed the Education Department that
"nothing in his role as a teacher should place his students or others in the
school at any risk of acquiring HIV infection. '26
The medical opinion apparently had little effect on a subsequent
decision by the Education Department. About a month before the start
of the new school year, the Department offered to transfer Chalk from his
classroom duties to a Department administrative position with the same
pay and benefits. The offer strongly parallels the offer of the Shelburne
County School Board to transfer Eric Smith from his classroom to an
administrative position.27
At least one significant fact distinguishes Chalk's story from Smith's,
however. A day after Chalk declined the offer, both he and the
Department filed actions in court. Chalk claimed that the school action
constituted unlawful discrimination on the basis of physical disability/
25. CDC, supra, note 20 at 3023.
26. Chalk, supra, note 1 at 701.
27. See note 2, supra.
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handicap in violation of federal antidiscrimination law. Pending a trial on
the merits, Chalk sought an injunction ordering the Department to return
him to his classroom duties. After an adverse decision in U.S. district
court, an appellate federal court one level below the U.S. Supreme Court
reversed the lower court ruling and authorized Chalk to return to
teaching. 28 Though the Court did not definitively decide the
discrimination claim, the ruling is of major import because (a) the Court
found Chalk likely to succeed on the merits of his claim, (b) it is the
highest U.S. Court to hold that those who suffer AIDS likely enjoy the
protection of federal handicapped antidiscrimination law and because (c)
the Court adopted a "significant risk of transmission" standard to test a
claim of alleged AIDS discrimination.
2. Federal Disability Dicrimination Law
Chalk filed his claim under Section 504 of the Federal Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 (FRA).29 The Act provides disabled persons a statutory right to
equal treatment, by prohibiting organizations, programs or activities
receiving federal monies from discriminating against the "handi-
capped".30 The prohibited employment discrimination is broad, and
applies to recruitment, hiring, promotion, demotion, transfer, layoffs and
termination.31 The statute defines "handicapped" as a person either with
a "physical or mental impairment" that substantially limits major life
activities, or as a person regarded as having such impairment.32 U.S.
28. Chalk, supra, note 1.
29. Codified, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ss, 701-96.
30. 29 U.S.C. ss, 793,794 ("No otherwise qualified individual with handicaps ... shall, solely
by reason of his handicap, be excluded from participation in ... or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.. .") See
also note 32, infra
31. 45 CodeFed Register 84.11(b)(4) (1987).
32. The statutory definition provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
... the term "individual with handicaps" means, for purposes of titles IV and V of this
Act [29 USCS ss 789 et seq., 790 et seq.], any person who (i) has a physical or mental
impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities,
(ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an
impairment 29 U.S.C. 706(7)(b). (emphasis added.)
It is an open question whether a March 1988 amendment to the Federal Rehabilitative Act
codified or amended the Arline ruling. The amendement provides that the term handicapped
"does not include an individual who has a currently contagious disease or an infection and
who, by reason of such disease or infection, would constitute a direct threat to the health and
safety of individuals or who, by reason of currently contagious disease or infection, is unable
to perform the duties of the job." CivilRights Restoration Act of 1987 s.9 (emphasis added),
EL. 100-259, 102 Stat. 31, amending 29 USC ss,706, 794. For purposes of our analysis, we
find the codification view the more persuasive. Accordingly, our discussion of the significant
risk analysis is developed on the assumption that "significant risk" is tantamount to or
synonymous with "direct threat."
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Department of Health and Human Services regulations further define
"physical impairment" to include "any physiological disorder or
condition" affecting the "hemic" (blood) or "lymphatic" system.33 Hence,
because HIV infection is a physiological disorder or condition in the
blood that "impairs," in part, by attacking the lymphatic system, AIDS
victims would seem likely to meet the threshold elements for qualifying
as "handicapped individuals" under the FRA.34
Yet, before Chalk, no appellate federal court in the U.S. had so directly
addressed the question, despite a recent U.S. Supreme Court opinion that
broached the issue. For about the time that events in Chalk were moving
towards court, the U.S. Supreme Court decided School Board of Nassau
Cnty., Fa. v. Arline.35 There, a public elementary school tacher sought
reinstatement and back-pay under the Federal Rehabilitation Act
following her discharge from work after a relapse from the contagious
disease of tuberculosis. Two general issues were before the Court: (1)
whether one suffering from a contagious disease is "handicapped" within
the meaning of the statute, and (2) how the risk and fears of infection
from contagious diseases should be weighed and analyzed in determining
whether one is "otherwise qualified" for employment despite one's
handicap.
In Arline, the Court held 7-2 that one physically disabled by the
contagious disease of tuberculosis is "handicapped" within the meaning
of the Federal Rehabilitation AcL36 The court construed the definition of
a handicapped individual to include those who are physically impaired
and those who are regarded as being impaired.37 Writing for the majority,
Justice Brennan addressed the role that the fear of contagion and medical
evidence play in applying the anti-discrimination provisions to those with
actual or perceived contagious diseases:
Few aspects of a handicap give rise to the level of public fear and
misapprehension as contagiousness. Even those who suffer or have
recovered from such non-infectious diseases as epilepsy or cancer have
faced discrimination based on the irrational fear that they might be
contagious. The Act is carefully structured to replace such reflexive
reactions to actual or perceived handicaps with actions based on reasoned
and medically soundjudgments.. .The fact that some persons who have
contagious diseases may pose a serious health threat to others under
33. 45 Code Federal Register s.84(3))(2)(i)(1987). HHS shares jurisdiction with the U.S.
Department of Labor for implementing and enforcing the Act. See discussion in Bentivegna,
infra, note 133.
34. See generally, Note, "Asymptomatic Infection with AIDS Virus as a Handicap Under the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973" (1988), 88 Colum. L. Rev. 563.
35. 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987).
36. Id, at 1127.
37. Id, at 1129. See generally, note 34, supra.
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certain circumstances does not justify excluding from the coverage of the
Act all persons with actual or perceived contagious diseases. Such
exclusion would mean that those accused of being contagious would never
have the opportunity to have their condition evaluated in light of medical
evidence and a determination made as to whether they were "otherwise
qualified." Rather, they would be vulnerable to discrimination on the basis
of mythology - precisely the type of injury Congress sought to prevent 8
Finally, in a passage of import to HIV-infected individuals who have
not developed visible physical impairment, the Court addressed whether
the contagiousness of a disease may be meaningfully distinguished from
physical impairment in determining handicap discrimination:
The United States argues that it is possible for a person to be simply a
carrier of a disease, that is, to be capable of spreading a disease, without
having a "physical impairment" or suffering from any other symptoms
associated with the disease. The United States contends that this is true in
the case of some carriers of the acquired immune deficiency syndrome
(AIDS) virus. From this premise the United States concludes that
discrimination solely on the basis of contagiousness is never discrimination
on the basis of the handicap. The argument is misplaced in this case,
because the handicap here, tuberculosis, gave rise both to a physical
impairment and to contagiousness. This case does not presenm and we
therefore do not reach the questions whether a carrier of a contagious
disease such as AIDS could be considered to have a physical impairmen4
or whether such a person could be considered, solely on the basis of
contagiousness, a handicapped person as defined by the Act 39 [emphasis
added]
Thus, though the court arguably left open the question whether all
AIDS carriers are "handicapped," its analysis clearly indicates that
individuals physically impaired by contagious diseases are protected by
U.S. federal law prohibiting discrimination against the disabled or the
handicapped. The Arline ruling may be expected to have precendential
effect in areas beyond federal jurisdiction because more than 20 states in
the U.S. have handicap anti-discrimination laws modeled on or
paralleling the federal Act.40
3. Significant Risk Analysis
In the wake of Arline, Chalk sought a preliminary injunction against the
Education Department initiatives to oust him from the classroom. In
38. Id, at 1129-30 (emphasis added).
39. Id, at 1128, n. 7.
40. See Wasson, "AIDS Discrimination Under Federal, State, and Local Law After Arline"
(1987), 15 Flor. St. Univ. L. Rev. 221 at 269 (discussing Colorado, Louisiana, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregan, Rhode Island, Vermont, Alaska, Connecticut,
District of Columbia, Illinois, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey laws).
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doing so, he afforded a U.S. Court of Appeals the opportunity to address
more fully the contagious disease and AIDS discrimination questions left
open by the Supreme Court. The Chalk Court directly applied the
principles of Arline to order the reinstatement of the AIDS-afflicted
teacher pending trial. The Court issued its order on finding that Chalk
had met the prerequisites for a preliminary injunction, namely; (1) that he
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits,41 (2) that if barred
from teaching, he would suffer irreparable injury in the form of
immediate emotional and psychological harms which could not be
compensated by monetary awards after trial,42 and (3) that the balance of
hardship weighed in Chalk's favor.43 The more instructive part of the
analysis centered on the "likelihood of success on the merits."
Applying Arline, the Court found that Chalk would likely prove he
had been discriminated against by the Education Department's refusal to
permit him to teach given the overwhelming medical evidence that he
posed "no significant risk" of communicating AIDS to others in the
school environment. The Court first expressly found that the Federal
Rehabilitaton Act fully applies to individuals suffering from contagious
diseases.44 Secondly, for purposes of its analysis, the Court assumed that
one who suffers physical impairment from the contagious disease of
AIDS is "handicapped" within the meaning of the Act.45 It thus relied on
and did not reject the express finding by the lower court that Chalk was
"handicapped." 46
Thirdly, the Court adopted a significant risk standard to test claims of
AIDS discrimination. The Court asked when a "handicapped"
individual, who may "perform the essential functions of the job", may be
properly excluded from employment.47 "The problem", the Court stated,
"is in reconciling the needs for protection of other persons, continuation
of the work mission and reasonable accommodation - if possible - of
the afflicted individual. '48 To effect a balance, the Court concluded that
the analysis should first focus on whether the AIDS-afflicted employee
poses a "significant risk" of communicating the disease to others in the
workplace:
41. Chalk, supra, note 1 at 709.
42. Id, at 709-710.
43. Id, at 710-711.
44. Id, at 704, citing Arline.
45. Id, at 705, n. 6.
46. Id, Though the lower court found Chalk to be a "handicapped" individual, it found he
posed an unacceptable health risk. See text accompanying note 56, infra.
47. Id, at 705, citing Arlina.
48. Id,
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A person who poses a significant risk of communicating infectious
disease to others in the workplace will not be otherwise qualifed for his
job or her job if reasonable accommodation will not eliminate the
risk...
The application of the standard requires, in most cases, an invidualized
inquiry and appropriate findings of fact so that "s.504 may achieve its goal
of protecting handicapped individuals from deprivations based on
prejudice, stereotypes, or unfounded fear, while giving appropriate weight
to such legitimate concerns ... as avoiding exposure of others to
significant health and safety risks."49
If the individualized inquiry reveals an employee poses a "significant
risk" of infection, the court must next determine if the accommodation
necessary to eliminate any significant risk is reasonable - that is, it
imposes no undue financial or administrative burden or fundamental
programmatic alterations on the employer.50
Applying the "significant risk" standard to the medical evidence on the
transmission of AIDS in the workplace, the Chalk Court analyzed the
risk criteria urged on, and adopted by, the Arline court in an amicus
submission by the American Medical Association: namely, the nature,
duraton, severity of risk, and probability of transmission and harm.51
Given the known avenues of AIDS transmission (initmate sexual contact,
mother to fetus, exposure to contaminated blood or other specific body
fluids), 52 the court turned to the medical evidence accumulated by U.S.
federal public health authorities to evaluate the specific risk of AIDS
transmission in the classroom:
None of the identified cases of AIDS in the United States are known or
are suspected to have been transmitted from one child to another in
school, day care or foster care settings. Transmission would necessitate
exposure of open cuts to the blood or other body fluids of the infected
child, a highly unlikely occurrence. Even then, routine safety procedures
for handling blood or other body fluids ... would be effective in
preventing transmission from children with AIDS to other children in
school ... Casual social contact between children and persons affected
with the AIDS virus is not dangerous.53
The Court found this view of the medical evidence to be shared by the
U.S. Centers for Disease Control, the Nationl Academy of Science
Institute of Medicine, and the American Medical Association (AMA).54
49. Id, at 705, citing Arline at 1131 (emphasis added).
50. Id
51. SeeArline, supra, note 35 at 1131, n. 16. See: Chalk, supra, note I at 705.
52. See note 20, supra.
53. Chalk, supra, note 1 at 706, citing U.S. Public Health Service, Surgeon General's Report
on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (1986).
54. Id, at 707.
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It quoted the amicus brief of the AMA to conclude that there is no
appreciable risk of HIV transmission "under the circumstances likely to
occur in the ordinary school setting."55
Finally, the Court emphasized that evaluating a "significant risk" of
transmission is not done on the basis of absolute certainty but on
reasonable medical opinions based on current medical evidence:
Nonetheless, the District Judge expressed skepticism about the current
state of medical knowledge. He was troubled that there might be
something yet unknown to science that might do harm. He said:
"It seems to me the problem is that we simply do not know enough
about AIDS to be completely certain. The plaintiff has submitted
massive documentation tending to show a minimal risk... but in any
event, the risk is small - the risk of infection through casual contact
... I reiterate, I think the risk is small. The likelihood is that the
medical profession knows exactly what it's talking about. But I think
it's too early to draw a definite conclusion, as far as this case is
concerned, about the extent of risk.'
This language demonstrates that the district court failed to follow the legal
standards set forth in Arline and improperly placed an impossible burden
of proof on the petitioner. Little in science can be proved with complete
certainty, and s. 504 does not require such a test. As authoritatively
construed by the Supreme Court, s. 504 allows the exclusion of an
employee only if there is significant risk of communicating an infectious
disease to others.56
To buttress its conclusion that Chalk had likely been discriminated
against, the Court cited analogous cass of discrimination against students,
infected with HIV or Hepatitis B, who had been initially barred from the
classroom.5 7 Days after the decision, Chalk resumed his high school
teaching responsibilities. 58
IV Relevance to Canada
The Chalk case is directly relevant to Canada for at least three reasons.
First, it provides authority from the proposition that HIV-infected
individuals are "disabled" within the meaning of applicable human rights
law. Secondly, it announces a "significant risk" of transmission analysis
to test claims that HIV-infected individuals should be barred or
transferred from the classroom or other employment settings. Thirdly, the
public law context in which Chalk arose suggests the strengths, limits and
55. Id
56. Id, at 707-708 (emphasis added).
57. Id, at 708, citing Thomas, Ray and Carey, discussed infra, note 118.
58. Personal communication with Chalk's lawyers.
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complementary role adjudicative bodies may play in developing AIDS
discrimination law and policy.
For example, had Eric Smith filed a complaint under the Nova Scoita
Human Rights Act alleging discrimination on the basis of physical
disability 59 the claim would have presenteed questions (1) whether an
HIV-infected (asymptomatic, seropositive) individual is "physically
disabled," within the meaning of the Nova Scotia Human Rights Ac4 60
(2) whether the nature and extent of disability "reasonably precludes
performance ' 61 of Smith's classroom teaching activities, and (3) whether
any discrimination is legitimized by a bona fide qualification. 62 Should
the reasoning in Chalk inform responses to these questions?
1. HiVInfection as a Disability
As to the first question, a narrow reading of Chalk may focus on the fact
that because Vincent Chalk had suffered physical impairment, the Chalk
Court did not directly reach the question of whether an asymptomatic
HIV-infected individual is "disabled" under applicable human rights
codes. A broader reading of Chalk may focus on the analytic approach
and statutory basis of the decision to conclude that even those perceived
as being HIV-infected are "disabled". As will be shown, courts have
tended towards the broader reading.63
59. Of course, employees who have suffered wrongful treatment by employers due to HIV-
infection may have other avenues of legal recourse. See eg., Pacific Western, supra, note 4
(arbitration grievance); Saxton v. Vanzant No-86-civ-59 (Fayette Cnty Ohio, Court of
Common Pleas, March 1986) (defamation); Zabusky v. MB WAdvertisingAgency, BNA Aids
Policy & Law, June 29, 1988 at 7 (slander and mental distress); Dr. Doe v. Primary Care
Corporation, CA No. 86-3777 (D.C. E. Va. 1986) (AIDS-related breach of contract). For
AIDS-related constitutional claims, see notes 64, 136, infra. For commentary on Canadian
slander per se mental distress, and invasion of privacy causes of action, see A. Linden,
Canadian TortLaw 50,52,363,641 (4th ed. 1988).
60. R.S.N.S. c. H-24. Protection against discrimination in employment on the basis of physical
disability is provided in s. 1 1B(1)(b) & (2) and l1lC(1)(d). The circumstances of Eric Smith's
transfer may raise the issue of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, though the
Nova Scotia legislation provides no express protection against such discrimination. Moreover,
there is Canadian authority to the effect that the protection against "sex discrimination" does
not include discrimination based on sexual orientation., See" Re Board of Governors of the
University of Saskatchewan and Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission (1976), 66 D.L.R.
(3d) 561 (Sask. Q.B.). Accordingly, the Nova Scotia Task Force on AIDS recommended
amending the Human Rights Act to prohibit, expressly, discrimination based on sexual
orientation. See NTSFA recommendation excerpted, infra, note 71.
61. Id, ss. 11B(1)(b) and InC(2)(a).
62. Id, s. 1 C(2)(d). The Nova Scotia Act uses the term "bonafide qualification" because the
defence is also relevant to discrimination in non-employment contexts. In most other
jurisdictions the terms bona fide occupational qualification or bona fide occupational
requirement are used. We use these terms interchangeably.
63. See text accompanying notes 68, 69, and 125. See also Note, supra, note 34 and
Centinela, infra, note 115.
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In the very least, Chalk may help in elaborating the principle of non-
discrimination in the AIDS context, for the purpose, function, and
definition of "handicap" in the Federal Rehabilitation Act (FRA)
generally parallel the purpose, function, and definition of handicap or
disability in Canadian human rights legislation." The Nova Scotia,
Ontario and federal acts, for example, define "physical disability" or
"handicap" to include "infirmity... caused by... illness". 65 Still, as one
Canadian commentator has noted, in contrast to the FRA, most
Canadian human rights codes have no regulations defining a handicap or
disability to include physiological conditions affecting the lymphatic
system.66 The inference is that such regulations would afford courts or
commissions more authority for construing AIDS-related impairments
under the statutory definitions of "disability" or "handicap".
The want of comparable regulations migh prove telling were it not for
the broad and purposive approach generally urged in construing and
applying human rights codes.67 Indeed, this consideration recently proved
dispositive in the first AIDS case to present squarely before a human
rights tribunal in Canada the question of whether HIV-infection is a
protected disability or handicap. In a case of alleged termination of a
residential tenancy due to AIDS, a B.C. human rights tribunal adopted a
purposive approach to hold that HIV-infection constitutes a physical
disability within the meaning of the B.C. Human Rights Act
Any person who is seropositive by manifesting antibodies to HIV has a
physical disability and, in the absence of a bona fide occupational
64. see, eg., Canadian Human Rights Ac R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6, s. 65.1(3); Ontario Human
Rights Code, R.S.O. 1980, c. 410 s. 9(b); Nova Scotia Human Rights Ac4 R.S.N.S. c. H-24 ss.
11B, 11C. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Ac 1982,
being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, s. 15, also provides explicit
protection against discrimination on the basis of "physical disability". For a general discussion
of the Charter and discrimination on the basis of physical disability, see David Lepofsky &
Jerome Bickenbach, "Equality Rights and the Physically Handicapped" in Bayefsky & Eberts
(eds.) Equality Rights and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Toronto: Carswell,
1985), c. 7, at 323-380. Charter protections against discrimination on the basis of disability
might be relied on directly. See: District 27 Comm. School v. Brd of Education, 502 N.Y.S. 2d
(Sup. Ct. 1986). (Mandatory HIV testing of mentally disabled students, who pose theoretical
risk of transmission, lacks rational basis and violates equal protection). In addition, human
rights legislation might be challenged as failing to provide adequate protection against
discrimination on the grounds of physical disability. For an example of the latter in the context
of sex discrimination, see Re Blainey and Ontario Hockey Ass'n (1986), 54 O.R. 513 (Ont.
C.A.) (leave to appeal denied) (athletic organizations exemption in Ontario Human Rights
Code struck down as unconstitutional).
65. Id
66. Kenney, "AIDS in the Workplace: Termination, Discrimination and the Right to Refuse"
(1988), 11 Dalhousie L.J. 581, 601.
67. See discussion in Action Travail des Femmes v. C.N.R. Co. (1987), 40 D.L.R. (4th) 193
at 206-9 (S.C.C.) per Dickson C.J.
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requirement, if applicable, is entitled to the protection set out in sections
3, 4, 5, 6, 8, and 9 of the Act This protection, by definition, would extend
to those who have been disagnosed as having ARC or AIDS. In my view,
there is nothing in the said decisons which would prohibit the said
protection from being exended to those who are "perceived" as having
ARC or AIDS.68
The tribunal relied, in part, on Arline, Chalk and other U.S. case law
and medical evidence to frame its analysis.69 Concluding that the B.C.
Act may protect even those associating with persons perceived as having
HIV-infection, the tribunal found the termination of the tenancy owed to
violations of the lease rather than AIDS discrimination. 70 Still, the
holding and principle survive the particular facts of Biggs. It would seem
to confirm that Chalk provides U.S. authority for the proposition that
HIV-infected individuals are handicapped or disabled. The reasoning in
Biggs promises to be of national precedential value, moveover, because
it is consistent with and supported by most Canadian authorities and
commentators.71
68. Biggs & Cole v. Hudson (1988), 9 C.H.R.R. D/5391 at D/5394, para. 40353. Compare
one of the first State Human Rights Commission decisions to the same effect, Shuttleworth v.
Broward City, FCHR No. 85-0624 (Fla. Dec. 11, 1985), explained in (1986), 9 Harv. J.L. &
Public Pol'y 739; companion federal claims at 639 F. Supp. 654 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
69. Id, at D/5395-96.
70. Id, at D/5395, D/5402. Cf, "AIDS Discrimination Costs Landlord $7000," Globe &
Mail 1 Dec. 1988, at A20. See also: Harton v. N.YC. Comm'n on Human Rights, 531 N.YS.
2d 979 (N.Y. Super. 1988).
71. See" Pacific Western, supra, note 4. Some commentators regard the definitions of
handicap or disability as offering broad protection. See Stewart, Solfan & Thorne, "Acquired
Immunodeficiency Syndrome - "AIDS", The Legal Issues are Also Frightening" (1988), 48
The Advocate 49 at 61. ("To date, there are no cases in British Columbia which fall within the
definition of 'physical disability'. In our opinion, adjudicators will decide that AIDS falls
within the defintion"); see also Bryden & Jarret, "AIDS, Employment Discrimination and the
B.C. Human Rights Act" (July 1988), 9 C.H.R.R. C/88-7 at c/88-11 and 14 (... "The
American case law does seem to support the view that it is not an unwarranted extension of
the meaning of the term "disability" in the human rights context to interpret the Act as
covering people actually suffering from AIDS. Since this is consistent with the Act's purpose,
there is no reason for the Council to reject this interpretation... we think it is appropriate for
people who are HIV sero-positive to be included in the class of individuals who are protected
from employment discrimination on the grounds of their disability."); Kenny, supra, note 41
at 601. ("Thus, it can be safely stated that there is nothing in Canadian human rights legislation
that would prevent a wide interpretation of handicap from being made, thereby offering a
protection to persons with communicable diseases and AIDS.") Other commentators
acknowledge the potentially broad coverage of the definitions, but query whether the language
reaches asymptomatic seropositive individuals. See Ducharme, "Preparing for a Legal
Epidemic: An AIDS Primer for Lawyers and Policy Makers" (1988), 26 Albta L. Rev. 471
at 487-488 ("It seems clear that complaints in AIDS-related cases will be dealt with as
discrimination on the basis of 'handicap' and 'physical disability'... It seems clear that anyone
suffering from any of the disabling effects of AIDS or an AIDS-related condition would be
covered by these definitions. However, it might be argued that an asymptomatic seropositive
individual is not caught by such language."); see also, The Canadian Bar Association -
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2. Significant Risk Analysis
Chalk also proves instructive in addressing employer defenses that HIV-
infected job applicants not be hired or that employees should be
discharged or transferred due to HIV infection. Under the Nova Scotia
legislation, an employer might argue that HIV infection "reasonably
precludes performance" of a job or that freedom from HIV infection is a
bonafide occupational qualification (bfoq).72 Under the "significant risk"
standard, adopted in Chalk and Arline and endorsed by the Nova Scotia
Task Force on AIDS,73 claims of discrimination are evaluated in light of
the best medical evidence of whether one poses a "significant risk" of
transmission in different contexts. The standard specifically requires court
analysis of the (1) nature of the risk, (2) duration of risk, (3) severity of
harm to third parties, and (4) nature and likelihood of transmission.74 If
one assumes on the basis of current medical evidence that HIV carriers
are "perpetually" infected and that the ultimate risk of harm to third
parties is "fatality," the inquiry reduces to an analysis of the nature and
likelihood of transmission.75 Biggs and Chalk indicate that courts tend to
regard the evaluations and recommendations of such federal public
health authorities as the U.S. Centers for Disease Control or the
Canadian Federal Centre for AIDS as cogent medical evidence on the
nature and likelihood of HIV transmission in different settings.76 If the
evidence suggests an employee poses a significant risk of transmission, the
inquiry turns to whether the employee may be accommodated without
undue financial or administrative burdens.77
Ontario, Report of the AIDS Committee 65 (1985) C... there appears to be no doubt that
either AIDS or ARC would fall within these definitions, but is less obvious that persons who
test antibody positive, who are otherwise asymptomatic, would fall within the terms of these
definitions.") Because of such potential ambiguity, other commentators have called for
amending human rights law to provide for explicit protection of all HIV-infected individuals.
See NSTFA, supra, note 3 at 67 ("The Nova Scotia Human Rights Act should be amended
to include protection expressly for persons who have, who are perceived to have, or who
associate with those who have a communicable disease and who pose no significant health risk
as determined by public health officers."); see also, Royal Society of Canada, A Perspective for
Canadians: AIDS Background Papers at 381 (1988) ("To make the legislation more certain
and humane, we recommend that all human rights legislation be amended to prohibit
discrimination based on evidence of HIV infection, perceived HIV-infection, sexual orientation
or perceived sexual orientation.").
72. See notes 61, 62, supra.
73. See NSTFA, supra, note 3 at 67.
74. See text accompanying note 51, supra,
75. This approach was generally outlined in Martinez v. School Brd of Hillsborough, 692 E
Supp. 1293 at 1304 (M.D. Fla. 1988), vacated and remanded for other reasons, 861 E 2d
1502. See text accompanying note 119, infra.
76. See Biggs, supra, note 68 at D/5392: Chalk, supra, note 1 at 707. See also: Pacific
Western, supra, note 4 at 306.
77. See text accompanying note 50, supra
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This framework of analysis may be applied to help test Nova Scotia
employer arguments that because of health risks to others an employee's
HIV-infected status "reasonably precludes performance of the particular
employment ' '78. This statutory language parallels the purpose and
function of the FRA provision protecting only those who are "otherwise
qualified" to perform the particular job.79 It would seem instructive,
therefore, to apply the Chalk approach to inquire whether an individual
poses a significant health risk to others. Application of the Chalk
approach to current medical evidence would seem to indicate that the
health risks posed by an HIV-infected employee do not "reasonably
preclude" employment in most job settings.
To buttress its position, however, an employer might argue that the
duty to provide a safe workplace further justifies the conclusion that the
HIV-infected individual is reasonably precluded from employment.
Indeed, employers under Nova Scotian and federal jurisdiction, for
example, do respectively have statutory duties to provide a workplace
"not likely to endanger" 80 or one free from "imminent danger."81 Current
epidemiological evidence that HIV-infected employees in most settings
pose no significant risk of HIV transmission, however, should satisfy
reasonable minds that such employees pose neither an "imminent
danger" to nor are "likely to endanger" the workplace. A labour relations
board recently adopted this view in concluding that, within the meaning
of the Canada Labour Code, a federal prison corrections officer was not
in "danger" of HIV infection in the workplace.82 Such reasoning also
extends to employers' common law duties. AIDS employment policies
structured on a significant risk standard, which itself comports with the
preponderance of medical evidence, should satisfy employers' general
common law duties to undertake prudent and objectively reasonable
precautionary measures.83
Similarly, the "significant risk" analysis helps test employer arguments
that the absense of HIV infection is a bfoq. In jurisdictions that follow or
78. See note 6I, supra.
79. See note 30, supra
80. OccupationalHealth & SafeO, Act S.N.S. 1985 c. 3, s. 22(1).
81. Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. L2 ss. 124-28.
82. Walton v. Treasury Board (1987), 16 C.C.E.L. 190 at 197 ("The danger of infection from
such contacts [with body fluids] has not, I believe, been ruled out definitively ... However,
'danger', as defined only exists if it could 'reasonably be expeced' that a condition would cause
illness. A speculative possibility of illness being caused is not enough to constitute a 'danger'.
I have no alternative but to conclude... that there can be no reasonable expectation of the
contact of the kind feared by Mr. Walton resulting in AIDS, and therefore that there was no
'danger' within the meaning of the Code".)
83. Cf. Doe v. American Airlines, No. 86-L-19638, (Cook Cnty., IMl. 1986).
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adopt a significant risk standard for HIV infection, the fact that HIV-
infected employees in most workplaces pose no significant risk to co-
employees or the public should render the bfoq defence generally
unavailing. In Canada the bfoq defense includes a subjective and
objective element.8 4 The subjective element requires that the qualification
be "imposed honestly, in good faith, and in the sincerely held belief that
such limitation is imposed in the interests of the adequate performance of
the work involved."8 5 Even assuming subjective good faith, application of
a significant risk standard of analysis suggests that the defense would
likely fail the objective prong of the test in most employment settings.
The objective element requires the employer to prove that the bfoq
relates "in an objective sense to the performance of the employment
concerned, in that it is reasonably necessary to assure the efficient and
economical performance of the job without endangering the employee,
his fellow employees and the general public." 86 Again, the overwhelming
medical evidence that HIV-infected individuals in most employment
settings pose no known risk to fellow employees or the public87 indicates
that freedom from HIV infection is not "reasonably necessary"; in
consequence, most employers' proffered defences would fail the objective
test. For the reasons outlined above, most employer attempts to justify
the bfoq defense on the basis of occupational health and safety duties
would also likely fail.
Whether the significant risk standard for evaluating bfoq defenses will
be adopted in Canada remains an open question. While the significant
risk terminology per se has yet to be employed, the significant risk
analytic process for risk assessment has been endorsed. In Ontario
Human Rights Commission v. Etobicoke, the Supreme Court of Canada
employed the term "sufficient risk" in a case in which a mandatory
retirement policy for 60 year-old firefighters was found not to be a bfoq:
84. The test was outlined by Mcntrye . in Ontario Human Rights Commission v. The
Borough of Etobicoke (1982), 3 C.H.R.R. D/781 at D/783 (S.C.C.). It has been recently
refined in Commission des droits de la personne du Quibec v. Ville de Brossard (1988), 2
S.C.R. 279 per Beetz . at 311-12.
85. Id, (emphasis added). For a discussion of the bfoq defence, see Beatrice Vizkelety,
Proving Discrimination in Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1987) at 201-224; Tamopolsky &
Pentney, Discrimination in Canada (2d ed.) (Toronto: Richard de Boo, 1987). Some
commentators (e.g., Vizkelety) draw a distinction between the bfoq defence and the business
necessity defence, the latter applying to cases involving "adverse effect" discrimination (as
defined in the Ontario Human Rights Commission and O'Malley v. Simpsons-Sears Ltd
(1986), 7 C.H.R.R. D/3102 (S.C.C.)). In light of Bhinder v. CNRail (1986), 7 C.H.R.R. D/
3093 (S.C.C.), however, the Canadian Supreme Court appears to have collapsed the two
together with the business necessity inquiry paralleling, in substance, the second prong of the
bfoq defense.
86. Id
87. See CDC, supra, note 20.
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In an occupation where, as in the case at bar, the employer seeks to justify
the retirement in the interest of public safety, the Court must consider
whether the evidence adduced justifies the conclusion that there is
sufficient risk of employee failure in those over mandatory retirement age
to warrant the early retirement in the interests of safety of the employee,
his fellow employees and the public at large.88
In deciding whether "sufficient risk" exists, the Court concluded "that in
cases such as this statistical and medical evidence based upon observation
and research" as opposed to "impressionistic" evidence is warranted.89.
This mirrors the analytic approach adopted in the Chalk and Arline
courts enunciation of the significant risk analysis.90
Even so, there is apparent Canadian authority for the proposition that
even a small or minimal risk suffices to establish a bfoq. In a case of
alleged discrimination against a diabetic, the Federal Court of Appeal
held that neither co-employees nor the public should be required to
accept any additional health risks to provide employment opportunities
for individuals with disabilities:
The [human rights tribunal] decision under attack, it seems to me, is based
on the generous idea that the employers and the public have the duty to
accept and assume some risks of damage in order to enable disabled
persons to find work. In my view, the law does not impose such a duty on
anyone.91
Such language would appear to be troubling for HIV-infected employees.
In fact, it echoes the language and analysis which the Chalk Court flatly
rejected.92
But such language may, and arguably should, not prove binding on
HIV-infected or like employees for several reasons. First, human rights
provisions are to be broadly construed, while exceptions thereto are to be
narrowly construed.93 Secondly, the Federal Court of Appeal case
involved assessment of the likelihood of injury, not medical evidence on
the risk of transmission of a contagious disease.94 Thirdly, while the Court
referred to small risks, it nonetheless grounded its decision on the
Supreme Court of Canada standard of whether a bfoq is "reasonably
necessary in order to eliminate a sufficient risk."' 95 "Sufficient" is an
88. Ontario Human Rights Commission v. The Borough of Etobicoke, supra, note 84, per
McIntyre J. at D/784.
89. Id
90. See text accompanying notes 38, 52, 53 supra.
91. Canadian Pacific Ltd v. Canadian Human Rights Commission (1987), 8 C.H.R.R. D/
4263 at D4268. (Fed. C.A.); leave to S.C.C. denied.
92. See text accompanying note 56, supra
93. Etobicoke, supra, note 88 at D/783; see also Vizkelety, supra, note 85 at 196.
94. See: Canadian Pacific, supra note 91 at D/4264-65.
95. Id, at D/4267, para. 33490.
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adjective of degree. "Reasonably necessary" connotes an objective
standard and "sufficient risk", as the Supreme Court has held, is a
determination arrived at by an analysis of objective, medical evidence.9 6
"Sufficient risk," then, would seem to suggest more than small or
minimal risk. Indeed, to simply or reflexively equate the two, arguably,
subverts the reasoning of the Supreme Court.97 Finally, applying the
small or minimal risk approach to an employee afflicted with HIV
infection, Hepatitis B, tuberculosis or like contagion would foster the very
stereotypes, unfounded fears, stigmatization, ostracism, and unemploy-
ment against which disability protections of human rights codes were
enacted.98 It would directly contravene the reasoning and holding of
Chalk, most U.S. courts99 that have addressed the issue, and persuasive
Canadian jurisprudence and commentary. 1'0 Such considerations provide
convincing grounds for rejecting the small or minimal risk approach in
Canada.
If the "significant risk" analysis is accepted as a more principled
approach to testing employer bfoq defenses, questions still remain
regarding the extent to which an employer has a duty to accommodate
an HIV-infected individual. Under Chalk and Arline, the employer must
accommodate an individual to the extent it is reasonable or does not pose
an "undue burden". 101 This approach is substantively the same as the
"undue hardship" test applied by the Ontario Human Rights
Commission to define the employer's duty to accommodate an HIV-
infected employee. 102
In contrast, in areas of federal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court of
Canada has held that a bfoq need not encompass any employer duty to
accommodate. 03 Such an absolutist approach seems comparatively harsh
on employees when viewed in light of the more balanced approach in
Ontario and Chalk. It has been criticized as inconsistent with, and would
seem to defeat, the broad remedial purposes of human rights
legislation.'04 To effect those remedial purposes an approach that
imposes, in substance, no duty to accommodate should at least hold
96. See text accompanying note 89.
97. Id
98. See text accompanying note 38, supra.
99. See cases cited in note 118, infra.
100. For a review of Canadian jurisprudence on point, see Mahon v. Canadian Pacific Ltd
(1986), 7 C.H.R.R. D/3287-D/3287-D/3288 (reversed on appeal); see also, Tarnopolsky &
Pentney, supra, note 85, (Cummulative Supplement) at 43-49.
101. See text accompanying note 50, supra.
102. Human Rights Code, S.O. 1981 c. 53, as amended by S.O. 1986 c. 64, s. 18(15).
103. Bhinderv. CNR Co., supra, note 85 at D/3096.
104. Id, per Dickson C.J. at D/3098-D/3099.
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employers to a stringent test or burden of proof (eg., clear and convincing
evidence) for establishing a bfoq. Indeed, more recent jurisprudence of
the Canadian Supreme Court suggests the Court may be moving in this
direction. 05 Such developments and the alternative Ontario and Chalk
approaches suggest that the absolutist approach and its underlying
statutory basis merit serious reconsideration.
3. AIDS Discrimination Law and Policy
Beyond the doctrinal issues, Chalk is instructive on the broader public
law context of developing AIDS discrimination law and policy. The case
illustrates the critical but reactive role adjudicative bodies play in
checking and defining discrimination under existing law. Indeed, courts
may play an invaluable societal role in protecting fundamental liberties
and balancing compelling public health interests in the face of dread
diseases. Chalk suggests that in instances where the medical evidence is
largely conclusive, where the alleged health risks involve conspicuous
public employment, and where there is implacable community resistance
to the continued employment of the individual, court pronouncements
may serve to remove legal ambiguity, vindicate individual rights, and
legitimate and compel unpopular institutional conduct.
The courts' roles notwithstanding, a more proactive approach might
involve the enactment of specific legislation to remove legal uncertainty
and define employment rights and duties in an AIDS era, as the Nova
Scotia Task Force and other commentators have urged'06.Discussions on
expressly including AIDS as a protected disability under human rights
codes have yet to yield provincial legislation, however.107 Such silence
from the legislators effectively leaves the development of AIDS
discrimination law and policy to adjudicative bodies and government
ministries. In consequence, Ministries of Health, Education, Justice and
Human Rights Commissions might choose to complement the largely
reactive roles of courts and tribunals by playing a proactive role. Mayoral
or municipal employment policies in Toronto,10 8 Boston, San Francisco,
Ann Arbor, Los Angeles, Philadelphia address or specifically bar AIDS
105. In Brossard, supra, note 84, Beetz J. elaborated the Etobicoke test for a bfoq requiring
that "the rule [be] properly designed to ensure the aptitude or qualification is met without
placing an undue burden on those to whom the rule applies" (at 312). The Supreme Court of
Canada has also recently granted leave in a religious discrimination case that raises the issue
of the duty to accommodate: see: Alberta Human Rights Commission v. Central Alberta Dairy
Pool [1989] 1 W.W.R. 78 (Alta C.A.); leave to appeal granted June 30, 1988.
106. NSTFA, supra, note 3. See also Royal Society of Canada supra, note 71.
107. See Bryden & Jarret, supra, note 71 at C/88-19, n. 21.
108. Policy & Guidelines with Respect to AIDS for the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto.
(Jan. 1988).
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employment discrimination against city employees or job applicants, for
example.' 09
Similarly, Human Rights Commissions may affirmatively guide AIDS
discrimination law and policy. In considering whether HIV-infection is a
protected disability under a human rights code, a commission may (a)
remain silent until the issue squarely presents itself, (b) recommend that
the human rights code be amended expressly to include HIV infection as
a protected disability, (c) initially or presumptively process AIDS
discrimination complaints as claimed disabilites, (d) adopt an official
public policy, by regulation or public pronouncement, (i) that HIV-
infected individuals are or are not considered protected, and (ii) that
addresses employers' use of medical exams to identify HIV-infected
individuals; (e) consult in the development of AIDS employment policies
and provide AIDS employment education as part of its educative
mandate.
In the absense of cases squarely presenting the issue, an official public
policy illustrates a modest, affirmative approach. The argument against
such an approach is that the Commission may be proceeding ultra vires,
or be seen as prematurely pronouncing on a delicate issue whose
resolution warrants further deliberation and a specific factual context.
The argument for an official public policy approach rejects the ultra vires
argument as a misconstruction of a human rights commission mandate,
and argues that affirmative pronouncements further the mandate and
likely pre-empt AIDS discrimination, by educating the public and by
elucidating the legal rights and duties in the workplace. Accordingly,
several North American jurisdictions have adopted a public policy
approach. Some U.S. jurisdictions have done so by declaring AIDS a
protected disability in human rights regulations.1 0 In Canada, such
jurisdictions as the Ontario,"' Manitoba 112 and Canadian Human Rights
Commissionli 3 have done so through formal policies and public
pronouncement.' 1 4
109. BNA, Individual Employment Rights Manual 509:211. See also Comihearst, "Educating
Through the Law: The Los Angeles AIDS Discrimination Ordinance" (1986), 33 U.C.L.A. L.
Rev. 1410.
110. See eg., note 135, infra
111. See Ontario Human Rights Commission Policy on AIDS (adopted Nov. 20,1985).
112. Manitoba Human Rights Commission Policy & Procedures Manual- Policy 1-1-72 (HI. V
Infection & Aids), effective June 1988. See also Background Notes to the Manitoba Human
Rights Commission Policy on HIVInfection/AIDS.
113. Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS): Policy Adopted by Canadian Human
Rights Commission (May 1988).
114. In contrast to the public pronouncement or formal public policy approach, the human
rights commissions of Alberta and Nova Scotia report that they process AIDS complaints
under the disability provisions of their Codes. (Personal communications with Commissions.)
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V The Emerging US. Consensus
Viewed a year in retrospect, it would apper that Chalk enunciated an
emerging consensus in U.S. AIDS discrimination law and public policy.
Like Chalk, most U.S. courts construing the Federal Rehabilitation Act
(FRA) have concluded that HIV-infected individuals enjoy protection of
the Act; they have as consistently accepted the heretofore uncontroverted
medical evidence that 1IV infection is not transmitted by the casual
contact that characterizes most employment settings. The Act has been
recently construed to protect even those regarded as having HIV
infection.1 5 In the employment context, while Chalk remains the leading
reported case under the FRA, other FRA cases are pending in U.S.
district courts;116 moreover, state adjudicative bodies have interpreted
analogous state law in reliance on or through reasoning that parallels
Chalk.177 In the school context, the Act has been invoked repeatedly to
enjoin schools from prohibiting HIV-infected children from the
classroom. 118 Indeed, a U.S. appellate court recently considered HIV
115. Doe v. Centinela, 57 U.S.L.W. 2034 (C.D. Cal. 1988). (alledgedly discriminationary
discharge of asymptomatic AIDS carrier from hospital alcohol and drug abuse program.) In
early 1989, a settlement was reached whereby the hospital rescinded its policy of testing and
excluding those perceived as HIV-infected. (Personal communication with plaintiffs lawyer.)
116. See, eg., Leckelt v. Bd of Commissioners of Hosp. Distr. 1, Terrebonne Parish, No. 86-
4235 (D.C. E. La, Filed Sept. 29, 1986) (nurse perceived at risk of HIV infection alleging
unlawful discrimination and discharge for failure to submit to HIV testing).
117. See: Raytheon v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission Superior Court of the State
of California for the County of Santa Barbara, No. 167995 (27 Apr. 1988), 56 U.S.L.W. 2637.
See also: Cronan v. New England Telephone No. 80332, (D.C. Mass. 1986) 55 U.S.L.W.
2202 (actual or perceived affliction with AIDS or ARC a protected disability).
118. Doe v. Dolton Elementary School District 694 F Supp. 440 (N.D. III. 1988) (granting
preliminary injunction prohibiting exclusion of 12-year old HIV-infected child from school);
Robertson v. Granite City Coin. Unit School D9, 684 F Supp. 1002 at 1006 (S.D. 111. 1988)
(granting preliminary injunction prohibiting exclusion of seven-year old HIV-infected
hemophiliac from classroom); Thomas v. Atascadero Unified School Dist, 662 F Supp. 376
(C.D. Cal. 1987) (granting preliminary injunction prohibiting exclusion of HIV-infected child
from classroom, despite child's involvement in biting incident); Ray v. School Dist of Desoto
County, 666 F Supp. 1524 (M.D. Ha. 1987) (granting preliminary injunction prohibiting
exclusion of three hemophiliac seropositive brothers from classroom). Roughly a year after the
Ray family home was firebombed which prompted the family to assume residence some 50
miles away, the school district which initially denied the Ray boys entry to school settled the
case for $1.1 million. N.Y limes, 2 Oct. 1988 at 20. But see, Martinez v. Sch. Bd Hillsborough
County, 675 F Supp. 1574 (M.D. Ha. 1987) (denying preliminary injunction for incontinent,
mentally disabled, HIV-infected child). For the sequels to this case, see footnote 75 and text
accompanying note 119. Compare: New York State Ass'n of Retarded Children v. Carey, 612
F2d 644, 650 (2d. Cir. 1979) (school segregation of children carriers of Hepatitis B, not shown
to pose significant risk of transmission, constitutes unlawful handicap discrimination), and
Kohl v. Woodhaven Learning Cntr., 865 E2d 930 (8th Cir. 1989) (reversing order that
residential vocational skills school accommodate Hepatitis B carrier's entry by instituting
Hepatitis B vaccine inoculation program), decision for en banc review pending, 4/89. See
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infection a protected disability and relied on the "significant risk"
standard to vacate a lower court order that a seven-year-old
neurologically disabled HIV-infected child attend school in a 9 x 6 foot
glass booth adjoining a classroom. 19
Paralleling the judiciary, the U.S. executive branch has now adopted
affirmative AIDS employment anti-discrimination policies. The Centers
for Disease Control (CDC) has for years amassed AIDS epidemiological
evidence and offered recommendations which has made the CDC a
leading medical force in minimizing discrimination against AIDS
carriers. 20 The personnel office for the U.S. government has adopted an
AIDS employment policy based on CDC employment recommenda-
tions.' 2 ' More recently, in July 1988, the Presidents Commission on
AIDS also relied on CDC medical evidence to conclude that
discrimination against HIV-infected individuals in the workplace,
housing, schools, and public accommodations, is "unwarranted because
it has no health basis. Nor is there any basis to discriminate against those
who care for or associate with such individuals."' 22 The Commission
called for AIDS anti-discrimination legislation, and an interim
Presidential Order declaring HIV infection a disability under the FRA.'23
Perhaps most revealing, the U.S. Justice Department recently
reconsidered its Arline'24 view, and unabashedly reversed itself to
conclude that symptomatic and asymptomatic HIV-infected persons
enjoy FRA protection:
We have further concluded that section 504 applies in substance in the
same way in the employment context,... Subject to an employer making
reasonable accommodation within the terms of his existing personnel
policies, the symptomatic or asymptomatic HIV-infected individual is
protected against discrimination if he or she is able to perform the duties
generally, "Discrimination in the Public Schools: Dick & Jane Have AIDS" (1988), 29 Win.
& Mary L. Rev. 881.
119. Martinez v. Sck Bd Hillsborough Cniy., 861 F 2d. 1502 at 1506 (1lth Cir. 1988). ("The
trial court found a 'remote theoretical possibility' of transmission with respect to tears, saliva,
urine. This does not rise to the significant risk level that is required for Eliana to be excluded
from the regular TMH classroom... Accordingly, we remand with directions that the trial
court make findings as to the overall risk of transmission.. ')
120. See Neslund, Mathews & Clernan, "The Role of the CDC in the Development of AIDS
Recommendations & Guidelines" (1987), 15 L. Med. & Hlth. Care 73. See also text
accompanying notes 52,53, supra.
121. U.S. Office of Personnel Management, "AIDS Guidelines for Federal Employers," 56
U.S.L.W. 2537; BNA, IndividualEmployment Rights Manual 595:343 1.
122. Report of the Presidential Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency irus Epidemic
at 119 (June 1988).
123. Id, at 121.
124. See text accompanying note 39, supra.
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of the job and does not constitute a direct threat to the health or safety of
others.125
Legislatively, the U.S. Congress recently passed anonymous AIDS
testing legislation; though it offers no express provisions on AIDS-specific
employment discrimination, 126 state legislators have been more active.
Some 30 U.S. jurisdictions have declared AIDS a disability for purposes
of employment discrimination law. 27 Wisconsin has even adopted the
"significant risk" standard as an exception to legislative prohibitions
against HIV testing of employees.
128
Indeed, the latter approach highlights the discriminatory potential of
requiring job applicants or employees to submit to HIV-screening as a
condition of employment. The World Health Organization 129 and
International Labour Organization have jointly advised against general
HIV screening for employment, as has the Health and Welfare Canada
National Advisory Committee on AIDS.130 Some U.S. jurisdictions have
enacted laws to bar IIV-tests that disqualify, terminate or otherwise
affect terms of employment. 131 Under both Canadian and U.S. laws, the
lawfulness of medical screening depends on whether it is "job related 132,
a business necessity 33, a "bona fide" occupational qualification 134 or
125. U.S. Justice Department, Office of Legal Counsel, Application of Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act to H-IV-Infected Individuals 29 (Sept. 1988). See also: N.Y imes, 7 Oct.
1988, at A17. For our commentary on significant and direct threat, see note 32 supra.
126. See Titles II ("AIDS Amendments of 1988") & IX ("Prison Testing Act of 1988") of the
"Health Omnibus Programs Extension of 1988," P.L. 100-607, 102 Stat. 3062,3171, affecting
42 USC s. 201, 300ee. See also:NY Times, 14 Oct. 1988, at A12. The legislation provides
federal monies to the states for anonymous HIV-testing and counseling, save for the mandatory
testing of those convicted of intravenous drug or sex offences. Arguably, the voluntary
underpinnings of the general anonymous testing provisions support a general public policy
against compulsory testing in most employment settings.
127. Comment, "Prohibiting the Use of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Antibody Test by
Employers & Insurers" (1988), 25 Harv. J. Legis. 275 at 286. See also, Lewis, "Acquired
Immunodeficiency Syndrome: State Legislation Activity" (6 Nov. 1987), 258(17) J.A.M.A.
2410; Gostin, "Public Health Strategies for Confronting AIDS - Legislative and Regulatory
Policy in the United States" (1989), 261(11), J.A.M.A. 1621.
128. See, eg., Wisc. Stat Ann. 103(15)(2) (West Supp. 1988). Cf.: Me Rev. Stat Ann., tit. 5,
s. 19203-C (West Supp. 1988) (judicially determined "significant risk" exception for
mandatory testing of patients after health care workers accidental exposure to patient's blood.)
129. WHO/ILO Global Program on AIDS, "Statement from the Consultation on AIDS &
the Workplace" (Geneva, June 1988). See also, Medical Pos4 25 Oct. 1988, at 51.
130. Health & Welfare Canada, "Human Immunodeficiency Virus Antibody Testing in
Canada: Recommendation of the National Advisory Committee on AIDS" (25 Feb. 1989),
15-8 Canada Diseases Widy Rpt. 37 at 41.
131. See Lewis, supra note 127 at 214.
132. See 45 CFR ss. 84.13, 84.14 (1987).
133. See, eg., Bentivegna v. U.S. Dept Labor, 694 E2d 619 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding
termination/non-hiring of diabetic, after pre-employment screening test, unlawful in that
employer failed to establish non-diabetic requirement as business necessity).
134. See Sask. Police Comm'n v. Sask Human Rights Comm'n (1984), 5 C.H.R.R. D/2317.
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used non-discriminatorly. 135 The Wisconsin approach suggests these
formulations may be tested, and in some instances resolved, by whether
the employment conduct and setting pose a significant risk of HIV
transmission to fellow employees or to one's clientle. 136 Current medical
evidence that HIV-infected individuals do not pose a risk of transmission
in most work settings suggests that HIV screening is seldom justified.137
Vi Conclusion." A North American Consensus? °
Taken together, the Chalk and Smith stories illustrate how law and
medicine should combine to educate the parties in and resolve a classic
AIDS employment controversy. The discovery of an HIV-infected
employee in one's workplace raises both acute anxiety about a lethal
contagious disease and deep sympathy for the afflicted employee. Before
Arline, the Eric Smith story, Chalk or Biggs, however, the law appeared
to offer more uncertainty and speculation than assurance or authority.
Today, society has begun to give meaning to the mandate of fair, equal
treatment of the working disabled in the context of AIDS. Courts, human
rights commissions, and legislators, increasingly tend to regard HIV
infection as a protected handicap or disability; U.S. courts increasingly
See also, "Yukon Aims to End Discrimination Against Disabled in Hiring Process," Medical
Pos Dec. 6, 1988, at 67; Ontario Human Rights Commission, Policy on Employment Related
MedicalExaminations (as amended, July 1986); Canadian Human Rights Commission, supra,
note 113 (HIV-negative status may qualify as bfoq where employee performs invasive medical
procedures, or performs duties impinging on public safety, or travels to countries barring HIV-
infected individuals). See also text accompanying notes 88-104. Compare Florida bfoq defense
that requires employers to show "substantial risk" of future injury or reasonable basis for risk
assessment. Shuttleworth, supra, note 68.
135. See, eg., Employment Regulations of the Maine Human Rights Commission, s. 3.08(E)
(May 1988). See also, Policy Position of the Maine Human Rights Commission (March 24,
1986) (construing AIDS as protected disability and elaborating standards, procedures and
burdens of proof for non-discriminatory use of pre-employment medical exams); Me Rev. Stat
Ann. tit. 5 s. 19204-B (West Supp. 1988 (barring health care facilities from HIV-testing of job
applicants or employees, unless based on bonafide occupational qualification). As of January
1989, the Maine Human Rights Commission had accepted seven Aids related complaints, all
of which involved employment.
136. See text accompanying note 53, supra. Compare: Local 1812 v. US. Dept of State 662
F. Supp. 50, 52 (D.D.C. 1987) (upholding addition of HIV-testing to medical exam required
of foreign services workers as rational and closely relatedly to fitness for duty) and Glover v.
E.N.C.O.k, 867 E2d. 461 (8th Cir. 1989) (mandatory employee screening is constitutionally
unreasonable search and seizure given minuscule risk of transmission). Compare R. v. Dyment
[1988] 2 S.C.R. 417 (unconsented blood test violates constitutional privacy interest) and
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S.Ct. 1384 (1989) (mandatory drug
urine test of drug enforcement officers does not violate constitutional right to privacy). See
generally Note, "The Constitutional Implications of Mandatory Testing for Acquired
Immunodeficiency Syndrome - AIDS" (1988), 37 Emery L.J. 217.
137. Accord, World Health Organization and Health & Welfare Canada National Advisory
Committee on AIDS. See text accompanying notes 129-130, supra.
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hold AIDS discrimination claims to a "significant risk" of transmission
standard. As Chalk makes clear, the standard declines the temptation to
test discrimination claims on the basis of absolute medical certainty. An
absolute standard would render it nigh impossible for complainants of
AIDS-based discrimination to succeed. Such a standard would cater to
biases, foster unfounded fear of contagion, invite further stigmatization
and ostracism of a particular class of disabled individuals, and so frustrate
the major purposes of human rights disability protections. Instead, the
significant risk standard suggests that, as a society, we accept reasonable
levels of risk to accommodate fundamental interests and competing
values.
Particularly as regards AIDS, the law properly depends on the medical
community for expertise in resolving controversy. The medical and
public health communities have concluded, on the basis of current
epidemiological evidence, that HIV-infected students138, teachers139, food
service workers, and most employees pose no significant risk of HIV
transmission either to fellow employees or to their respective cientles.140
Of course, this general view may not extend to employment settings that
involve regular exposure to blood products, as occurs in hospital
emergency rooms, surgery, medical examiner offices - all of which
involve conduct and risks that may make the nature and likelihood of
HIV transmission more than theoretical or more than "minimal."141
The contrast in the risks of transmission in different settings suggests
that adoption of a "significant risk" standard ensures a uniform analytical
approach not uniform outcomes. The ambiguity inherent in the standard
may be reduced by appreciating that "significant risk" refers to a range in
138. American Academy of Pediatrics, "School Attendance of Children & Adolescents With
HTLV/LAV Infection" (1986), 77(3) Pediatrics 430. See also, CDC, "Education & Foster
Care of Children Infected with Human T-lymphotrophic Virus Type Ill/lymphodenopathy -
Associated Virus" (30 Aug. 1985), 34 Morbidity, Mortality Weekly Rpts. 583.
139. CDC, supra, notes 20,24.
140. Id
141. See U.S. Dept. of Labor, "Occupational Exposure to Hepatitis B Virus & Human
Immunodeficiency Virus,' 52 Federal Register 45438 (proposed rule forthcoming). See also
U.S. Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control, "Guidelines for Prevention of
Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Hepatitis B Virus to Health Care and
Public Safety Workers" (Feb. 1989), (forthcoming in Morbidity Mortality WIdy. Rpt.);
Universal Precautions, supra; note 22; Centers for Disease Control, "Update: Universal
Precautions for Prevention of Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus, Hepatitis B
Virus, and other Bloodbome Pathogens in Health Care Settings" (22/29 July 1988), 260(4)
J.A.M.A. 462; Marus, "Surveillance of Health Care Workers Exposed to Blood from Patients
Infected with Human Immunodeficiency Virus" (27 Oct. 1988) 319 (17) N.E.J.M. 1118. But
see Gostin, "HIV-Infected Physicians & the Practice of Seriously Invasive Procedures," 19
Hasting Cntr. Rpt 32 (Jan./Feb. 1989); Federal Centre for AIDS, "Occupational Exposure to
the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Among Health Care Workers in Canada" (1 Mar. 1989),
140 C.M.A.J. 503 (no cases of seroconversion in 205 cases of potential exposure).
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the spectrum of risks which is distinct from the polar extremes of
theoretical or minuscule and imminent and unequivocal risk. Chalk and
Biggs counsel educators, the courts and policy makers to defer to
reasonable expert medical opinion in determining precisely where on the
spectrum of risk a particular fact situation lies.
If these principles were lost in the events on Cape Sable Island, perhaps
the Eric Smith story will not have been lived in vain. As one of the first
blatant instances of potential public AIDS employment discrimination in
Canada, it necessarily stirred local and national thought and paranoia, as
it caught "society unprepared."' 42 Today Eric Smith serves as an AIDS
education curriculum consultant to the Nova Scotia Department of
Education; he is no longer in the classroom. 43 Months after Vincent
Chalk returned to the classroom his lawyers and the school department
signed a consent decree wherein Chalk agreed to dismiss his complaint in
exchange for attorney fees, an undisclosed amount of damages, and an
agreement that he would continue to teach. 1' Due in part to the disabling
effects of AIDS he has, of late, been teaching three of five days a week. 45
Still, the legacy endures. Some employers have begun to adopt formal
AIDS employment policies. 46 Others should do so. Such policies might
at least (a) treat HIV-infection like other employee life-threatening
illnesses; (b) affirm the employer's commitment to reasonable
accommodation; (c) implement appropriate training, safe-work and
hygiene procedures to minimize any risk of HIV transmission; (d)
provide AIDS education and counselling for all employees; (e) guarantee
strict confidentiality; (f) maintain HIV-infected employee eligibility for
company benefits; (g) establish internal procedures to resolve AIDS
conflicts. Educators have also begun to help pre-empt AIDS conflicts and
dispel public health illiteracy, by adopting such policies 147 and by doing
what they do best: educating, in this instance, pupils, teachers, and the
public on AIDS. 48 Perhaps the lessons of the Eric Smith and Vincent
Chalk stories have thus made society the wiser. For in the tradition of the
best of their calling, these teachers have taught us as much about the
subject matter as about ourselves.
142. The Nova Scotia Task Force on Aids so describes the Eric Smith story. See NSTFA,
supra, note 3 at 27.
143. Personal communication with Mr. Smith, February 22, 1989.
144. Personal communication with Chalk's lawyers.
145. Id
146. See, eg., text accompanying notes 108, 109, 121, supra.
147. See" Cooperman, supra, note 7.
148. See eg., "Da's AIDS Policy a First for Atlantic Universities," Medical Post 8 Nov.
1988, at 72. Sometimes developing "satisfactory" AIDS curricula has proven to be a
formidable task. See Globe & Mail, 25 March 1988, at A7. See generally CDC, "Guidelines
for Effective School Health Education to Prevent the Spread of AIDS" (29 Jan. 1988), 37(S-
2) Morbidity & Mortality Weekly Rpt.
